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Abstract
This essay aims to redress the contention that epistemic possibility
cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I argue that
the interaction between the two-dimensional intensional framework and
the mereological parthood relation enables epistemic possibilities to target
the haecceitistic properties of individuals. I outline the elements of plural
logic, and I specify, then, a two-dimensional intensional formula encoding
the relation between the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension
and its metaphysical possibility. I examine the Julius Caesar problem as
a test case. I conclude by addressing objections from the indeterminacy of
ontological principles relative to the space of epistemic possibilities, and
from the consistency of epistemic modal space.
1 Introduction
In this essay, I endeavor to provide an account of how the epistemic interpreta-
tion of two-dimensional intensional semantics can be sensitive to de re modali-
ties. Let a model, M, be comprised of a set of epistemically possible worlds C;
a set of metaphysically possible worlds P; a domain, D, of terms and formulas;
binary relations defined on each of C and P; and a valuation function mapping
terms and formulas to subsets of C and P, respectively. So, M = 〈C, P, D,
RC , RP , V〉. A term or formula is epistemically necessary or apriori iff it is
inconceivable for it to be false ( ⇐⇒ ¬⋄¬). A term or formula is negatively
conceivable iff nothing rules it out apriori (⋄ ⇐⇒ ¬¬). A term or formula
is positively conceivable only if the term or formula can be perceptually imag-
ined. According to the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional
semantics, the semantic value of a term or formula can then be defined relative
1
to two parameters, a context and an index. The context ranges over the set of
epistemically possible worlds, and the index ranges over the set of metaphysi-
cally possible worlds. The value of the term or formula relative to the context
determines the value of the term or formula relative to the index. Thus, the
epistemically possible value of the term or formula constrains the metaphysi-
cally possible value of the term or formula; and so conceivability might, given
the foregoing, serve as a guide to metaphysical possibility.
Roca-Royes (2011) and Chalmers (2010; 2011; 2014) note that, on the above
semantics, epistemic possibility cannot track the difference between the meta-
physical modal profile of a non-essential proposition – e.g., that there is a shoot-
ing star – and the metaphysical modal profile of an essential definition, such as
a theoretical identity statement – e.g., that water = H2O. Another principle
of modal metaphysics to which epistemic possibilities are purported to be in-
sensitive is haecceity comprehension; namely, that ∀x,y∃Φ(Φx ⇐⇒ x =
y).
The aim of this note is to redress the contention that epistemic possibil-
ity cannot be a guide to the principles of modal metaphysics. I will argue
that the interaction between the two-dimensional intensional framework and
the mereological parthood relation enables epistemic possibilities to target the
haecceitistic properties of individuals.
In Section 2, I examine a necessary condition on admissible cases of con-
ceivability entailing metaphysical possibility in the two-dimensional intensional
framework, focusing on the property of super-rigidity. I argue that – despite the
scarcity of properties which satisfy the super-rigidity condition – metaphysical
properties such as the parthood relation do so. In Section 3, I address objec-
tions to two dogmas of the semantic rationalism underpinning the epistemic
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interpretation of two-dimensional intensional semantics. The first dogma states
that distinctions can be delineated between linguistic intensions and conceptual
epistemic intensions, while the second dogma records that there are criteria on
the basis of which formal from informal domains, unique to the extensions of
various concepts, can be distinguished, such that the modal profiles of those
concepts would thus be determinate. I examine the Julius Caesar problem as
a test case. I specify, then, a two-dimensional intensional formula encoding the
relation between the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension and its
metaphysical possibility. In Section 4, I address objections from the indetermi-
nacy of ontological principles relative to the space of epistemic possibilities, and
from the consistency of epistemic modal space. Section 5 provides concluding
remarks.
2 Super-rigidity
The interaction between mereological parthood and epistemic and metaphysi-
cal possibility avoids one crucial issue for the epistemic interpretation of two-
dimensional intensional semantics. The issue is that, unless the semanic value
for a term is ’super-rigid’, i.e. maps to the same extension throughout the sets of
epistemic and metaphysical possibilities, the extension of the term in epistemic
modal space risks diverging from the extension of the term in metaphysical
modal space.
There appear to be only a few expressions which satisfy the super-rigidity
condition. Such terms include those referring to the properties of phenome-
nal consciousness, to the parthood relation, and perhaps to the property of
friendship (Chalmers, 2012: 367, 374). Other candidates for super-rigidity are
taken to include metaphysical terms such as ’cause’ and ’fundamental’; numer-
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ical terms such as ’one’; and logical constants such as ’∧’ (Chalmers, op. cit.).
However, there are objections to each of the other proposed candidates.
Against the super-rigidity of ’fundamental’, Fine (2001: 3) argues that a
proposition is fundamental if and only if it is real, while Sider (2011: 112, 118)
argues that a proposition is fundamental iff it possesses a truth-condition (in a
’metaphysical semantics’, stated in perfectly joint-carving terms) for the sub-
propositional entities – expressed by quantifiers, functions, predicates – com-
prising the target proposition. The absolute joint-carving terms are taken to
include logical vocabulary (including quantifiers), metaphysical predicates such
as mereological parthood, and physical predicates.
Against the super-rigidity of ’cause’, Sider (op.cit.: 8.3.5) notes that a causal
deflationist might argue that causation is non-fundamental. By contrast, a
causal nihilist might argue that causation is non-fundamental as well, though
for the distinct reason that there is no causation. So, while both the deflationist
and nihilist believe that ’cause’ does not carve at the joints – the nihilist can
still state that there is a related predicate, ’cause*’, such that they can make
the joint-carving claim that ’Nothing causes* anything’, whereas the deflationist
will remain silent, and maintain that no broadly causal locutions carve at the
joints.
Against the super-rigidity of ’one’, Benacerraf (1965) notes that, in the re-
duction of number theory to set theory, there must be, and is not, a principled
reason for which to prefer the identification of natural numbers with von Neu-
mann ordinals (e.g., 2 = {∅, ∅}), rather than with Zermelo ordinals (i.e., an
order-type of a well-ordering 2 = {{∅}}).1
Against the super-rigidity of the logical connective, ∧, the proponent of
1Cf. Zermelo (1908/1967) and von Neumann (1923/1967). Well-orderings are irreflexive,
transitive, binary relations on all non-empty sets, defining a least element in the sets.
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model-theoretic validity will prefer a definition of the constant according to
which, for propositions φ and ψ and a model, M, M validates φ ∧ ψ iff M
validates φ and M validates ψ. By contrast, the proponent of proof-theoretic
validity will prefer a distinct definition which makes no reference to truth, ac-
cording to which ∧ is defined by its introduction and elimination rules: φ,ψ ⊢
φ∧ψ; φ∧ψ ⊢ φ; φ∧ψ ⊢ ψ.
Finally, terms for physical entities such as ’tensor field’ might have a rigid
intension mapping the term to the same extension in metaphysical modal space,
and a non-rigid intension mapping the term to distinct extensions in epistemi-
cally possible space, such that what is known about the term is contingent and
might diverge from its necessary metaphysical profile.2 That physical terms are
not super-rigid might be one way to challenge the soundness of the conceivabil-
ity argument to the effect that, if it is epistemically possible that truths about
consciousness cannot be derived from truths about physics, then the dissoci-
ation between phenomenal and physical truths is metaphysically possible (cf.
Chalmers, 2010: 151).
Crucially for the purposes of this note, there appear to be no clear counterex-
amples to the claim that mereological parthood is super-rigid. If this is correct,
then mereological parthood in the space of epistemic modality can serve as a
guide to the status of mereological parthood in metaphysical modal space. The
philosophical significance of the foregoing is that it belies the contention prof-
fered by Roca-Royes (op. cit.) and Chalmers (op. cit.) concerning the limits
of conceivability-based modal epistemology. The super-rigidity of the parthood
relation ensures that the interaction between the conceivability of mereological
2A ’tensor field’ is a function from m ’1-forms’ at a spacetime point, p, and n vectors at p,
to the real numbers. A 1-form is a function, ω, s.t. ω maps four vectors to the real numbers,
and satisfies the condition that for vectors ≥ 2, µ, τ , and real numbers α and β: ω(αµ + βτ)
= αω(µ) + βω(τ). Cf. Arntzenius (2012): 72.
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parthood, which records the existence of haecceities, can serve as a guide to the
metaphysical modal profile of haecceity comprehension.
3 Two Dogmas of Semantic Rationalism
The tenability of the foregoing depends upon whether objections to what might
be understood as the two dogmas of semantic rationalism can be circumvented.3
3.1 The First Dogma
The first dogma of semantic rationalism mirrors Quine’s (1951) contention that
one dogma of the empiricist approach is the distinction that it records between
analytic and synthetic claims. The analogous dogma in the semantic rationalist
setting is that a distinction can be drawn between linguistic epistemic intensions
– witnessed by differences in the cognitive significance of two sentences or terms
which have the same extension, e.g., with x = 2, ’x2’ and ’2x’ – by contrast
to conceptual epistemic intensions – e.g., those which denote the properties of
phenomenal consciousness. The distinction coincides with two interpretations of
two-dimensional intensional semantics. As noted, the epistemic interpretation of
two-dimensional intensional semantics takes the value of a formula relative to a
context ranging over epistemically possible worlds to determine the extension of
the formula relative to an index ranging over metaphysically possible worlds (cf.
Chalmers, op. cit.). According to the metasemantic interpretation, a sentence,
such as that ’water = H20’, is metaphysically necessary, whereas assertions made
about metaphysically necessary sentences record the non-ideal epistemic states
of agents and are thus contingent (cf. Stalnaker, 1978, 2004). The first dogma
is thus to the effect that there are distinct sets of worlds – sets of non-linguistic
3Thanks to xx for the objections.
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conceptual possibilities and of linguistic presuppositions, respectively – over
which the context ranges in the epistemic and metasemantic interpretations.
Two examples might be apposite. The physical law that force can be identi-
fied by calculating the product of mass and acceleration, f = ma, has a distinct
linguistic intension than that for a reformulated version of the law, according
to which force can be identified by calculating the product of mass and the
independently calculated product of acceleration and the second derivative of
position, f = m(d2x/dt2) (cf. Hicks and Schaffer, 2015: 17). However, ’f =
ma’ and ’f = m(d2x/dt2)’ have identical ideal conceptual epistemic intensions.
Similarly, the linguistic intension for the parthood relation can vary while its
conceptual intension remains constant. Thus, the linguistic intension for the
sentence that ’the class of renates is a part of the class of cordates’ is distinct
from the linguistic intension for the sentence that ’the class of entities with kid-
neys is a part of the class of entities with hearts’. However, the ideal conceptual
epistemic intensions for the two thoughts are identical.
If no conditions on the distinctness between linguistic and conceptual epis-
temic intensions can be provided, then variance in linguistic intension might
adduce against the uniqueness of the conceptual intension. Because of the pos-
sible proliferation of epistemic intensions, conditions on the super-rigidity of the
formulas and terms at issue might thereby not be satisfiable. The significance of
the first dogma of semantic rationalism is that it guards against the collapse of
conceptual and linguistic epistemic intensions, and thus the collapse of language
and thought.
A defense of the first dogma of semantic rationalism might, in response, be
proffered, in light of the status of higher-order distributive plural quantification
in natural language semantics. Plural quantifiers are distributive, if the individ-
7
uals comprising the plurality over which the quantifier ranges are conceived of
singly, rather than interpreting the quantifier such that it ranges over irreducible
collections. Natural language semantics permits plural quantification into both
first and second-level predicate position. For all second-order variables ranging
over a domain of individuals, one can define a predicate denoting a plurality of
individuals at the first level (cf. Rayo, 2006). Subsequently, if there is an indi-
vidual which satisfies the predicate, then the individual is a part of the extension
of the predicate, i.e., the relevant plurality of individuals . For an example in
English, the predicate can be interpreted such that it denotes the plurality, ’the
books’. Then, an individual satisfies the predicate if and only if it is a part of the
plurality of books. It is similarly innocuous in English to avail of plural quantifi-
cation into second-level predicate position. For all third-order variables ranging
over a domain of individuals, one can define a predicate denoting a plurality of
individuals at the second level. E.g., the predicate might be interpreted such
that it denotes the second-level plurality, the chamber pieces, in the sentence,
’These quartets are among her chamber pieces’. Then, the first-level plurality,
the quartets, satisfies the predicate if and only if it is a part of the second-level
plurality of chamber pieces over which the third-order plural quantifier has been
defined to range (op. cit.).
Advancing to a higher order, for all fourth-order variables ranging over a
domain of individuals, one can define a predicate which denotes a plurality
of individuals at the third level. However, there are no examples of plural
quantification into third-level predicate position in empirical linguistics, despite
that examples thereof can be readily countenanced in intended models of formal
languages.
The philosophical significance of the foregoing is that it is conceptually in-
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nocuous for plural terms of an arbitrary type, iα, to satisfy a polyadic predicate
at iα+2th-order which denotes pluralities of type iα+1, such that pluralities of
the iαth-type can be defined as parts of pluralities of the iα+1th-type. Yet – for
polyadic predicates at order > 3 – the above has, as just noted, no analogue in
natural language. As follows, higher-order plural quantification might adduce
in favor of the first dogma of semantic rationalism, to the effect that linguistic
and conceptual epistemic intensions can be sufficiently distinguished.
3.2 The Second Dogma
The second dogma of semantic rationalism mirrors Quine’s (op. cit.) contention
that another dogma of empiricism is the reduction of the meaning of a sentence
to the empirical data which verifies its component expressions. The analogous
dogma in the semantic rationalist setting states that individuation-conditions
on concepts can be provided in order to distinguish between concepts unique to
formal and informal domains. The significance of the second dogma of semantic
rationalism is that whether the objects falling under a concept belong to a formal
domain of inquiry will subsequently constrain its modal profile.
In the space of epistemic possibility, it is unclear, e.g., what reasons there
might be to preclude implicit definitions such as that the real number of the x’s is
identical to Julius Caesar (cf. Frege, 1884/1980: 56; Clark, 2007) by contrast to
being identical to a unique set of rational numbers as induced via Dedekind cuts.
It is similarly unclear how to distinguish, in the space of epistemic possibility,
between formal and informal concepts, in order to provide a principled account
of when a concept, such as the concept of ’set’, can be defined via the axioms of
the language in which it figures, by contrast to concepts such as ’water’, where
definitions for the latter might target the observational, i.e. descriptive and
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functional, properties thereof.
The concept of mereological parthood provides a further borderline case.
While the parthood relation can be axiomatized so as to reflect whether it
is irreflexive, non-symmetric, and transitive, its status as a formal property
is more elusive. The fact, e.g., that an order-type is part of the sequence of
ordinal numbers impresses as being necessary, while yet the fact that a number
of musicians comprise the parts of a chamber ensemble might impress as being
contingent.
The Julius Caesar problem, and the subsequent issue of whether there might
be criteria for delineating formal from informal concepts in the space of epistemic
modality, may receive a unified response. The ambiguity with regard to whether
the parthood relation is formal – given that its relata can include both formal
and informal objects – is similar to the ambiguity pertaining to the nature of real
numbers. As Frege (1893/2013: 161) notes: ’Instead of asking which properties
an object must have in order to be a magnitude, one needs to ask: how must a
concept be constituted in order for its extension to be a domain of magnitudes
[. . . ] a thing is a magnitude not in itself but only insofar as it belongs, with other
objects, to a class that is a domain of magnitudes’. Frege defines a magnitude
as the extension of a relation on arbitrary domains (op. cit.). The concept of
a magnitude is then referred to as a ’Relation’, and domains of magnitudes are
defined as classes of Relations (162). Bypassing the rational numbers, Frege
defines, then, the real numbers as relations on – namely, ratios of – magnitudes;
and thus refers to the real numbers as ’Relations on Relations’, because the
extension of the higher-order concept of real number is taken to encompass the
extension of the lower-order concept of classes of Relations, i.e., domains of
magnitudes (op. cit.). The interest of Frege’s definition of the concept of real
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number is that explicit mention must be made therein to a domain of concrete
entities to which the number is supposed, as a type of measurement, to be
applied.
In response: The following implicit definitions – i.e., abstraction principles
– can be provided for the concept of real number, where the real numbers
are defined as sets, or Dedekind cuts, of rational numbers. Following Shapiro
(2000), let F,G, and R denote rational numbers, such that concepts of the reals
can be specified as follows: ∀F,G[C(F) = C(G) ⇐⇒ ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒ G≤R)].
Concepts of rational numbers can themselves be obtained via an abstraction
principle in which they are identified with quotients of integers – [Q〈m,n〉 =
Q〈p,q〉 ⇐⇒ n = 0 ∧ q = 0 ∨ n 6= 0 ∧ q 6= 0 ∧ m x q = n x p]; concepts of the
integers are obtained via an abstraction principle in which they are identified
with differences of natural numbers – [D(〈x,y〉) = D(〈z,w〉) ⇐⇒ x + w =
y + z]; concepts of the naturals are obtained via an abstraction principle in
which they are identified with pairs of finite cardinals – ’∀x,y,z,w[〈x,y〉(=P) =
〈z,w〉(=P) ⇐⇒ x = z ∧ y = w]; and concepts of the cardinals are obtained via
Hume’s Principle, to the effect that cardinals are identical if and only if they
are equinumerous – ∀A∀B∃R[[Nx: A = Nx: B ≡ ∃R[∀x[Ax → ∃y(By ∧ Rxy
∧ ∀z(Bz ∧ Rxz → y = z))] ∧ ∀y[By → ∃x(Ax ∧ Rxy ∧ ∀z(Az ∧ Rzy → x =
z))]]].
Frege notes that ’we can never [. . . ] decide by means of [implicit] definitions
whether any concept has the number Julius Caesar belonging to it, or whether
that same familiar conqueror of Gaul is a number or not’ (1884/1980: 56). A
programmatic line of response endeavors to redress the Julius Caesar problem
by appealing to sortal concepts, where it is an essential property of objects that
they fall in the extension of the concept (cf. Hale and Wright, 2001: 389, 395).
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In order further to develop the account, I propose to avail of recent work in
which identity conditions are interpreted so as to reflect relations of essence
and explanatory ground. The role of the essentiality operator will be to record
a formal constraint on when an object falls under a concept ’in virtue of the
nature of the object’ (Fine, 1995: 241-242). The role of the grounding operator
will be to record a condition on when two objects are the same, entraining
a hyperintensional type of implicit definition for concepts which is thus finer-
grained and less susceptible to error through misidentification.
In his (2015), Fine treats identity criteria as generic statements of ground.
By contrast to material identity conditions which specify when two objects are
identical, criterial identity conditions explain in virtue of what the two objects
are the same. Arbitrary, or generic, objects are then argued to be constitutive
of criterial identity conditions. Let a model, M , for a first-order language,
L, be a tuple, where M = 〈I, A, R, V 〉, with I a domain of concrete and
abstract individuals, A a domain of arbitrary objects, R a dependence relation
on arbitrary objects, and V a non-empty set of partial functions from A to I (cf.
Fine, 1985). The arbitrary objects in A are reified variables. The dependence
relation between any a and b in A can be interpreted as a relation of ontological
dependence (op. cit.: 59-60). Informally, from a∈A s.t. F (a), one can infer
∀x.F (x) and ∃x.F (x), respectively (57). Then, given two arbitrary objects, x
and y, with an individual i in their range, ’[(x = i ∧ y = i) → x = y]’, such
that x and y mapping to a common individual explains in virtue of what they
are the same (Fine, 2015).
Abstraction principles for, e.g., the notion of set, as augmented so as to
record distinctions pertaining to essence and ground, can then be specified as
follows:
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• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) ←x,y (x = y)]
(Intuitively, where the ’given’ expression is a quantifier ranging over the
domain of variables-as-arbitrary objects: Given x, y, whose values are sets, it is
essential to x and y being the same that they share the same members); and
• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) →x,y (x = y)]
(Intuitively: Given arbitrary objects, x, y, whose values are sets, the fact
that x and y share the same members grounds the fact that they are the same).
Combining both of the above directions yields the following hyperintensional,
possibly asymmetric, biconditional:
• Given x,y, with Set(x) ∧ Set(y): [∀z(z∈x ≡ z∈y) ↔x,y (x = y)].
A reply to the Julius Caesar problem for real numbers might then avail of the
foregoing metaphysical implicit definitions, such that the definition would record
the essentiality to the reals of the property of being necessarily non-concrete:
• Given F,G[C(F) = C(G) ↔F,G ∀R(F≤R ⇐⇒ G≤R)], and
• ∀XX/F∃Y [¬E(Y) ∧ (X = Y)]
(Intuitively: Given arbitrary objects, F,G, whose values are the real num-
bers: It is essential to the F’s and the G’s that the concept of the Fs is identical
to the concept of the G’s iff (i) F and G are identical subsets of a limit rational
number, R, and (ii) with E(x) a concreteness predicate, necessarily for all real
numbers, X, necessarily there is a non-concrete object Y, to which necessar-
ily X is identical; i.e., the reals are necessarily non-concrete. The foregoing is
conversely the ground of the identification.)4
4Rosen and Yablo (2020) also avail of real, or essential, definitions in their attempt to solve
the Caesar problem, although their real definitions do not target grounding-conditions. The
need for a grounding-condition is mentioned in Wright (2020: 314, 318).
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Heck (2011: 129) notes that the Caesar problem incorporates an epistemolog-
ical objection: "Thus, one might think, there must be more to our apprehension
of numbers than a mere recognition that they are the references of expressions
governed by HP [Hume’s Principle – HK]. Any complete account of our appre-
hension of numbers as objects must include an account of what distinguishes
people from numbers. But HP alone yields no such explanation. That is why
Frege writes: ’Naturally, no one is going to confuse [Caesar] with the [number
zero]; but that is no thanks to our definition of [number]’ (Gl, 62)".
The condition of being necessarily non-concrete in the metaphysical defi-
nition for real numbers – which includes conditions of essence and ground –
provides a reply to the foregoing epistemological objection, i.e. the required
account, beyond the abstraction principle, of what distinguishes people from
numbers.
3.3 Mereological Parthood
The above proposal can then be generalized, in order to countenance the ab-
stract profile of the mereological parthood relation. By augmenting the axioms
for parthood in, e.g., classical mereological parthood with a clause to the effect
that it is essential to the parthood relation that it is necessarily non-concrete,
parthood can thus be understood to be abstract; and truths in which the relation
figures would thereby be necessary.
• Given x: Φ(x) ∧ ∀x∃y [¬E(y) ∧ (x = y)] ↔x Γ(x) where
• Γ(x) := x is the parthood relation, <, which is irreflexive, asymmetric,
and transitive, and where the relation satisfies the axioms of classical
extensional mereology codified by the predicate, Φ(x) (cf. Cotnoir, 2014):
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Weak Supplementation: x < y → ∃z[(z < y ∨ z = y) ∧ ¬∃w(w < z ∨ w =
z) ∧ (w < x ∨ w = x)], and
Unrestricted Fusion: ∀xx∃y[F(y,xx)],
with the axiom of Fusion defined as follows:
Fusion: F(t,xx) := (xx < t ∨ xx = t) ∧ ∀y[(y < t ∨ y = t) → (y < xx ∨
y = xx)]
Fusions are themselves abstracta, formed by a fusion-abstraction principle.
The abstraction principle states that two singular terms – in which an ab-
straction operator, σ, from pluralities to fusions figures as a subformula – are
identical, if and only if the fusions overlap the same locations (cf. Cotnoir, ms).
Let a topological model be a tuple, comprised of a set of points in topological
space, µ; a domain of individuals, D; an accessibility relation, R; and a valuation
function, V, assigning distributive pluralities of individuals in D to subsets of µ:
M = 〈µ,D,R,V〉;
R = R(xx,yy)xx,yy∈µ iff Rxx ⊆ µxx x µxx, s.t. if R(xx,yy), then ∃o⊆µ, with
xx∈o s.t. ∀yy∈oR(xx,yy), where the set of points accessible from a privileged
node in the space is said to be open; and V = f(ii∈D, m∈µ).5 Necessity is
interpreted as an interiority operator on the space:
M,xx  φ iff ∃o⊆µ, with xx∈o, such that ∀yy∈o M,yy  φ.
The following fusion abstraction principle can then be specified:
Given xx,yy,F[σ(xx,F) = σ(yy,F) ↔xx,yy [f(xx,m1) ∩ f(yy,m1) (6= ∅)]].
(Intuitively, given arbitrary objects whose values are the pluralities, xx,yy:
It is essential to xx and yy that fusion-abstracts – formed by mapping the
pluralities to the abstracta – are identical, because the fusions overlap the same
5µ is further Alexandrov; i.e., closed under arbitrary unions and intersections.
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nonstationary – i.e., 6= ∅ – locations. The converse is the determinative ground
of the identification.)
The foregoing constraints on the formality of the parthood relation – both
being necessarily non-concrete and figuring in pluralities which serve to individ-
uate fusions as abstract objects – are sufficient then for redressing the objections
to the second dogma of semantic rationalism; i.e., that individuation-conditions
are wanting for concepts unique to formal and informal domains, which would
subsequently render the modal profile of such concepts indeterminate. That
relations of mereological parthood are abstract adduces in favor of the claim
that the values taken by the relation are necessary. The significance of both
the necessity of the parthood relation, as well as its being abstract rather than
concrete and thus being in some sense apriori, is that there are thus compelling
grounds for taking the relation to be super-rigid, i.e., to be both epistemically
and metaphysically necessary.
Finally, a third issue, related to the second dogma is that, following Dummett
(1963/1978: 195-196), the concept of mereological parthood might be taken to
exhibit a type of ’inherent vagueness’, in virtue of being indefinitely extensible.
Dummett (1996: 441) defines an indefinitely extensible concept as being such
that: ’if we can form a definite conception of a totality all of whose members fall
under the concept, we can, by reference to that totality, characterize a larger
totality all of whose members fall under it’. It will thus be always possible to
increase the size of the domain of elements over which one quantifies, in virtue of
the nature of the concept at issue; e.g., the concept of ordinal number is such that
ordinals can continue to be generated, despite the endeavor to quantify over a
complete domain, in virtue of iterated applications of the successor relation, and
the concept of real number is such that the reals can continue to be generated
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via elementary embeddings. Bernays’ (1942) theorem states that class-valued
functions from classes to sub-classes are not onto, where classes are non-sets
(cf. Uzquiano, 2015a: 186-187). A generalization of Bernays’ theorem can be
recorded in plural set theory,6 where the cardinality of the sub-pluralities of an
incipient plurality will always be greater than the size of that incipient plurality.
If one takes the cardinal height of the cumulative hierarchy to be fixed, then
one way of tracking the variance in the cardinal size falling in the extension
of the concept of mereological parthood might be by redefining the intension
thereof (Uzquiano, 2015b). Because it would always be possible to reinterpret
the concept’s intension in order to track the increase in the size of the plural
universe, the intension of the concept would subsequently be non-rigid; and the
concept would thus no longer be super-rigid.
One way in which the objection might be countered is by construing the
variance in the intension of the concept of parthood as tracking temporal modal
properties, rather than metaphysical modal properties. Then, the relation can
be necessary while satisfying full S5 – i.e., modal axioms K [(φ→ ψ)→ (φ→
ψ)], T (φ→ φ), and E (¬φ→ ¬φ) – despite that there can be variations
in the size of the quantifier domains over which the relation and its concept are
defined. Let ↑ be an intensional parameter which indexes and stores the relevant
formulas at issue to a particular world (cf. Hodes, 1984). The ↓-symbol is an
operator which serves to retrieve, as it were, that indexed information. Adding
multiple arrows is then akin to multiple-indexing: The value of a formula, as
indexed to a particular world, will then constrain the value of that formula, as
indexed – via the addition of the new arrows – to different worlds. Interpreting
the operators temporally permits there to be multiple-indexing in the array
6See Burgess (2004/2008), for an axiomatization of ’Boolos-Bernays’ plural set theory, so
named after the contributions of Bernays (op. cit.) and Boolos (1984, 1985). See Linnebo
(2007), for critical discussion.
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of intensional parameters relative to which a formula gets its value, while the
underlying logic for metaphysical modal operators can be S5, partitioning the
space of worlds into equivalence classes. Formally:
↑1 ∀x∃φ ↑2 ∃y[φ(x) ↓1 ∧ φ(y) ↓2].
The clause states that, relative to a first temporal parameter in which all of
the x’s satisfying the sethood predicate are quantified over, there is – relative to
a distinct temporal parameter – another element which satisfies that predicate.
Crucially, differences in the intensional temporal indices, as availed of in order
to record variance, at different times, in the size of the cumulative hierarchy
of elements falling in the range of the parthood relation, is yet consistent with
the cardinality of the elements in the domain falling in the range of the relation
being fixed, such that the valuation of the relation can yet be necessary.
3.4 Summary
In this section, I addressed objections to two dogmas of the semantic rational-
ism underpinning the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional intensional
semantics. In response to objections to the first dogma – according to which
no distinctions can be delineated between linguistic intensions and conceptual
epistemic intensions – I noted that higher-order plural terms are conceptually
tractable although they have no analogue in natural language semantics. In
response to objections to the second dogma – according to which criteria on dis-
tinguishing formal from informal domains unique to the extensions of various
concepts are lacking, which subsequently engenders indeterminacy with regard
to the modal profiles of those concepts – I availed of generic criterial identity
conditions, in which it is essential to identical arbitrary representatives of objects
that they satisfy equivalence relations which are conversely ground-theoretically
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determinative of the identification, and further essential thereto that they satisfy
the predicate of being necessarily non-concrete. The extensions of indefinitely
extensible concepts can further be redefined relative to distinct temporal inten-
sional parameters, despite that the background modal logic for the intensions
of the concepts partitions the domain of worlds into equivalence classes, and
thus satisfies S5. Thus, parthood can be deemed a necessary, because abstract,
relation, despite (i) temporal variance in the particular objects on which the
parthood relation is defined; and (ii) variance in the cardinality of the domain
in which those objects figure, relative to which the concept’s intensions are
defined.
When Φ = xxx, ∀x,y∃Φ(Φx ⇐⇒ x = y). By the super-rigidity of the
parthood relation, the target two-dimensional intensional formula can, finally,
be stated as follows:
If it is epistemically possible that Φx, then it is metaphysically possible that
Φx. Formally:
∀c∈C,p∈PJΦxKc,p = 1 iff ∀c’∈C,p’∈PJΦxKc
′,p′ = 1.
Thus, the epistemic possibility of haecceity comprehension constrains the
value of the metaphysical possibility of haecceity comprehension, and – in re-
sponse to Roca-Royes and Chalmers – there is a case according to which con-
ceivability is a guide to a principle of modal metaphysics.
In the remainder of the paper, I will examine issues pertaining to the deter-
minacy of epistemic possibilities.
4 Determinacy and Consistency
In his (2014), Chalmers argues for the law of excluded middle, such that it is
either apriori derivable using the material conditional – i.e. ’scrutable’ – that
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p or scrutable that ¬p, depending on the determinacy of p. Chalmers refers to
the case in which p must be determinate, entailing determinate scrutability, as
the Hawthorne model, and the case in which it can be indeterminate, entailing
indeterminate scrutability, as the Dorr model (259).7 Chalmers argues that,
for any p, one can derive ’p iff it is scrutable that p’ from ’p iff it is true that
p’ (262). However, ’p iff it is scrutable that p’ is unrestrictedly valid only on
Dorr’s, and not Hawthorne’s, model (op. cit.).8
Chalmers suggests that the relevant notion of consistency might be a prop-
erty of epistemic possibilities rather than metaphysical possibilities. However,
there are general barriers to establishing the consistency of the space of epis-
temic modality.
One route to securing the epistemic interpretation of consistency is via
Chalmers’ conception of idealized epistemic possibility. Conceivability is ideal
if and only if nothing rules it out apriori upon unbounded rational reflection
(2012: 143). The rational reflection pertinent to idealized conceivability can be
countenanced modally, normatively, and so as to concern the notion of epistemic
entitlement. An idealization is (i) modal iff it concerns what it is metaphys-
ically possible for an agent to know or believe; (ii) normative iff it concerns
what agents ought to believe; and (iii) warrant-involving iff it concerns the
propositions which agents are implicitly entitled to believe (2012: 63). It is
7Cf. Dorr (2003: 103-4) and Hawthorne (2005: sec. 2).
8Chalmers rejects the epistemicist approach to indeterminacy, which reconciles the deter-
minacy in the value of a proposition with the epistemic indeterminacy concerning whether
the proposition is known (op. cit.: 288). Consider, e.g., a color continuum, beginning with
a determinate color hue of red and terminating with a determinate color hue of orange. By
transitivity, if the determinate hue of red, x, is phenomenally similar to the next point in the
continuum, y, and y is phenomenally similar to the next point, z, then x is phenomenally
similar to z. However, iterating transitivity would entail that the terminal color hue is red
and not orange. Thus, if the culprit in the sorites paradox is the property of transitivity, then
the modal axiom which encodes transitivity (namely 4: φ → φ) is false. The epistemic
interpretation of the axiom states that if one knows that φ, then one knows that one knows
that φ. Thus, rejecting axiom 4 entails that the cut-off points in a sorites series are know-
able, although one cannot know that one knows them. For further discussion, see Williamson
(1994).
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unclear whether any of (i)-(iii) in the foregoing would either mandate belief in
the claim that ’p ∧ it is indeterminate whether p’ is true, or explain in virtue
of what the conjuncts are consistent. More general issues for the consistency
of epistemically possible worlds, even assuming that the idealization conditions
specified in (i)-(iii) are satisfied, include Yablo’s (1993) paradox, and Gödel’s
(1931) incompleteness theorems. Yablo’s paradox is as follows:
(S1) For all k>1, Sk is false;
(S2) For all k>2, Sk is false;
...
(Sn) For all k>n, Sk is false;
(Sn+1) For all k>n+1, Sk is false.
(Sn) says that (Sn+1) is false. Yet (Sn+1) is true. Contradiction.9
Gödel’s incompleteness theorems can be thus outlined. Relative to a choice
of (i) coding for an ω-complete, recursively axiomatizable language, L – i.e. a
mapping between properties of numbers and properties of terms and formulas
in L; (ii) a predicate, phi; and (iii) a fixed-point construction: Let phi express
the property of ’being provable’, and define (iii) s.t., for any consistent theory
T of L, there are sentences, pphi, corresponding to each formula, phi(x), in T,
s.t. for ’m’ := pphi,
|–T pphi iff phi(m).
One can then construct a sentence, ’m’ := ¬phi(m), such that L is incomplete
(the first incompleteness theorem).
Crucially, moreover, L cannot prove its own consistency:
If:
|–T ’m’ iff ¬phi(m),
9For further discussion, see Cook (2014).
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Then:
|–T C → m.
So, L is consistent only if L is inconsistent (the second incompleteness the-
orem).
Another issue concerning the consistency of ’p ∧ it is indeterminate whether
p’ – let alone the foregoing general issues concerning the consistency of epistemic
modal space – is that Chalmers (2009: 102) endorses the indeterminacy of meta-
physical proposals such as unrestricted fusion and, presumably, the necessity of
parthood, with regard to which the epistemic interpretation of consistency would
be irrelevant (264).
To redress the issue, the metaphysical indeterminacy of ontological propos-
als might be treated as in Barnes and Williams (2011), for whom metaphysical
indeterminacy consists in there being an unpointed set of metaphysically possi-
ble worlds; i.e., a set of metaphysical possibilities, P, such that precisifications
concerning the determinacy in the values of the elements of P leave it unsettled
which possibility is actual (116, 124). If so, then metaphysical indeterminacy
will provide no new objection to the viability of the two-dimensional intensional
framework, because the conditions on ascertaining the actuality of the epistemic
possibility in the context – relative to which a formula receives a value, and thus
crucially determines the value of the formula relative to an index which ranges
over metaphysically possible worlds – are themselves indeterminate (cf. Yablo,
2008).
The more compelling maneuver might instead be to restrict the valid apriori
material entailments to determinately true propositions; and to argue, against
Chalmers’s preferred ontological anti-realist methodology, that the necessity of
parthood is both epistemically and metaphysically determinately true, if true at
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all. The (determinate) truth of the proposition might then be corroborated both
by the consistency of its augmentation to the logic underlying the intensional
semantics, and perhaps in virtue of other abductive criteria – such as strength,
simplicitly, and compatability with what is known – on the tenability of the
proposal.
5 Concluding Remarks
One of the primary objections to accounting for the relationship between con-
ceivability and metaphysical possibility via the epistemic interpretation of two-
dimensional intensional semantics is that epistemic possibilities are purportedly
insensitive to modal metaphysical propositions, concerning, e.g., the haecceitis-
tic properties of individuals. In this paper, I have endeavored to redress the fore-
going objection, by noting that it relies on an unduly restrictive, propositional
view of the elements of epistemic modal space, which ignores the interaction
between epistemic possibilities and the nature of higher-order quantification.
Further objections, from both the potential indeterminacy in, and inconsis-
tency of, the space of epistemic possibilities, were then shown to be readily
answered. In virtue of the super-rigidity of the parthood relation, epistemic
modal space can thus serve as a guide to haecceity comprehension principles in
modal metaphysics, and thus to de re modality.
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